



FOREIGN POLICY

PAKISTAN AND INDIA

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FOREWORD

The document is an attempt to see Pakistan's external relations with its immediate eastern neighbor, India, in a contemporary light. The strategies recommended in this policy come from the belief that Pakistan's stable internal security and Pakistan's elevated presence in the global economy are principal dictators of its Foreign Policy.

An aggressive, liberal and a pro-active foreign policy makes way for improved ties with the nations of the world.


Predictably, the regional scenario of South Asia, particularly of the region encompassing the countries of Pakistan, India, Afghanistan, China, Iran, Nepal, Bangladesh and the Central Asian States is likely to remain volatile in the near future. Pakistan is a stakeholder in the scenario and regional instability is inadvertently going to have a decelerating influence on the country's road to peace and progress.

With Pakistan and India's relation being strengthened via the tools of negotiations and diplomacy, it can be expected that inter-regional cooperation will be catalyzed. Thus, better ties between the two most significant neighbors in the region, Pakistan and India, symbolize enhanced cooperation in the South Asian region on the whole.

The document sets out a two-faceted goal, Short-Term and Long-Term and bridges the proposed solutions to the principal issues between Pakistan and India, through a road-map.

Note: 'Foreign Policy' has been formulated by Members of the Youth Parliament in their individual and collective capacities and does not necessarily bear affinity-of-opinion to PILDAT (Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency) and its officials.

ROAD MAP



NOTE : IT MUST BE MENTIONED THAT THIS ROAD MAP WILL ALWAYS REMAIN CONDITIONAL TO 4 PRINCIPLES.
(The 4 Principles are mentioned in the end)

(I) ECONOMIC RELATIONS

India's advancing economy has turned it into the 2nd economic giant (after China) in the South Asian region; Pakistan's economic growth on the contrary, is becoming increasingly stagnant. Pakistan, clearly, does not enjoy an alternative and it must move forward vigorously to secure economic collaborations with India.

It must be realized that trade is the most significant factor which governs the relations between any two countries.

Current Scenario:

- (a)** Trade between Pakistan and India amounts to US \$ 2.7 Billion/Year,
- (b)** As of 2011, \$ 1.47 Billion/Year of this trade is in favor of India,
- (c)** In 1995, when India granted MFN (Most Favored Nation) Status to Pakistan, the trade-off between Pakistan and India was US \$ 53 Million/Year in favor of India; this rose to US \$ 168 Million/Year in 1996 and has continued to increase,
- (d)** Although Pakistan and India signed the 'Customs Cooperation Agreement', the 'Mutual Recognition Agreement' and the 'Redressal of Grievances Agreement' in February 2012, India continues to impose strict safeguard restrictions and quality criteria on its imports which makes it difficult for Pakistani products to have greater access to the Indian market,
- (e)** Agriculture and Textile products which are exported from Pakistan to India are subject to Composite Tariff. This means that Pakistan's products are charged with a special fee, besides the regular ad-valorem tax,
- (f)** Pakistan's exports to India largely comprise of Agriculture, Textile and Garment Products. These 3 sectors are subject to the highest tariff rates in India. Cotton is charged at Rs. 108/kilogram; Tariff on the Dairy Products is from 40-60%, Garments are charged at Rs. 85/piece, Agriculture Items at a Tariff of 35%. These rates are generally considered to be unfairly high.
[It must be mentioned that Pakistan's high-quality products like Cotton/Lawn Fabric and Bed Linens are in popular demand in the Indian markets]
- (g)** Pakistani exporters complain that India continues to exercise country-specific Non-Tariff Import Barriers in Pakistan's case,
- (h)** India argues that these NTBs (Non-Tariff Barriers) are the same for all of its trading partners,
- (i)** Pakistan itself does not have a standardized import regime. Indian exporters, therefore, have to deal with fewer restrictions of product quality and specifications,
- (j)** In August 2012, India lifted its ban on Pakistani businesspersons to invest in India.

Proposed Solution:

Trade between Pakistan and India has the potential to reach US \$ 10 Billion/Year, thus:

- (a)** Pakistan should upgrade its manufacturing industry and improve the value-addition processes of exportable items. Better-Quality products are more likely to have greater access to the Indian markets,
- (b)** Pakistani manufacturers and businesspersons are at a disadvantage because Indian exporters have fewer product restrictions in Pakistan while Pakistani exporters have to deal with strict product-quality specifications in India. Pakistan should regulate its import regime and maintain better standards for the quality of import items,
- (c)** Pakistan should urge India to abide by the 3 landmark trade agreements (signed in February 2012) and simplify the following trade requirements:
 -) Custom Documentation formalities,
 -) Tariff Structure,
 -) The whole procedure of obtaining and renewing the Bureau of India Standards (BIS) License,
- (d)** Pakistan should also urge India to ease the requirement of agricultural permits and automobile licenses on imports coming from Pakistan,
- (e)** State Bank of Pakistan and Reserve Bank of India should open cross-border branches on the basis of mutual benefits,
- (f)** Both countries should work towards the opening of the Munabao-Khokrapar Route (in Sindh, Pakistan) as a feasible trade route,
- (g)** Pakistan and India should finalize liberalizations in the Visa Regime, including Multiple-Entry and Greater-Duration Visas for businesspersons.
[Indian Home Ministry has agreed to relax its previous stance that it will not allow relaxations in the business and civilian visa regime, unless Pakistan takes action against the Mumbai 26/11 terrorists],
- (h)** Visa relaxations will help Pakistani rice exporters in learning technical expertise for rice cultivation. Pakistani automobile (specifically tractor industry) and cement industry can have strong potential in Indian markets if Pakistani manufacturers will themselves visit India frequently and explore the market of 1.2 billion people,
- (i)** The Economic Zone between Kasur (Pakistan) and Amritsar (India) should be established,
- (j)** Pakistan must go ahead with granting the MFN Status to India on 3 conditions:
 -) That Pakistan will maintain a well-prepared 'Sensitive List' for items which can not be imported from India. This will ensure the safeguard of Pakistan's local industry,
 -) That India will reciprocate by reducing its 'Sensitive List' on items which can not be imported from Pakistan, including tariff relaxations on Pakistan's Textile,
 -) That India should lift its ban from Indian investors on investing in Pakistan.

(II) SIR CREEK

Out of all other bilateral disputes between Pakistan and India, the Sir Creek Dispute can be expected to have a relatively quick solution. The settlement of this dispute can be used as an important Confidence-Building Measure to build on to resolve other pending disputes.

Sir Creek is a 96 km strip of water.

It is made up of marshes which makes it water-logged for most of the year.

It runs in the Rann of Kutch area. The Rann of Kutch area lies between the south of Sindh in Pakistan and the State of Gujrat in India.

Historical evidence (specifically the 1908 Imperial Gazetteer of India) clearly indicates that during the British Rule in India, the Rann of Kutch was part of Sindh.

Later, when India was partitioned in 1947, Sindh became a part of Pakistan (therefore Sir Creek also became a part of Pakistan).

According to Paragraphs 9 and 10 of the '1914 Bombay Resolution' (which was signed between the Government of Bombay and the Ruler of Kutch), the 'Green Line' as indicated in the map clearly demarcated the boundaries of Sir Creek and included the whole of it in Sindh.



India then argued that from the technical aspect, the 'Green Line' is not a boundary but just an 'indication of a boundary'. India claimed that the boundary of Sir Creek lies mid-channel into the water and that exactly half of Sir Creek is part of India.

To validate this claim, India endorses the 'Thalweg Principle'.

In 1965, Indian forces unfairly attempted to seize Sir Creek because India wanted to establish its naval base in the Gulf of Kutch. As a result, India gained control of a part of Sir Creek.

When the prospect of important mineral resources (oil/gas) was discovered in the sub-surface of Sir Creek, Pakistan and India became more serious about their respective claims.

Both countries now realize that if they loose one kilometer of Sir Creek on ground, it would subsequently mean a loss of hundreds of square nautical miles of the resourceful economic zone under-water.

India's current stance is that boundaries should first be marked under-water and according to the under-water boundaries, the land boundaries shall be demarcated.

Pakistan's current stance is to first demarcate on the ground and then under-water.

Pakistan wants the adoption of the 1914 Bombay Resolution.

Pakistan was willing to invite international arbitration because it believes it has a strong case. But India always wanted to keep this issue bilateral.

Proposed Solution-1914 Bombay Resolution:

- (a) India's endorsement of 'Thalweg Principle' is not applicable in the case of Sir Creek because Sir Creek is 'water-logged and not navigable' for most part of the year. The Thalweg Principle holds applicable only for navigable areas.
- (b) The demarcation of land boundaries shall be done first. The demarcation of the under-water maritime boundaries will then follow.
- (c) India's unreasonable argument that demarcation shall first be done under-water will have to be countered. Hydrographers from both Pakistan and India have declared that environmental changes have occurred over the years and it is not possible anymore to distinguish between territorial waters without demarcating the land area first.
- (d) During the process of demarcation, the '1991 Pakistan-India Agreement on Advance Notice on Military Exercises, Maneuvers and Troop Movement' will be strictly followed by both sides to ensure peace along the coastline of Sir Creek.
- (e) After demarcating Sir Creek, both countries will submit their respective boundary limits to the 'Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf' (CLCS). The CLCS will consider and evaluate the data submitted by each country.
- (f) Here, Pakistan will automatically have a stronger case because according to the rules of CLCS, India can not mention Sir Creek as a part of its continental shelf in the documents which it will submit to CLCS.
- (g) 3 factors will further strengthen Pakistan's case. First, Sir Creek was a major water distributory of River Indus and Pakistan has an undisputed right over River Indus. Second, the 'Green Line' shown in the maps of 1914 Bombay Resolution clearly brings Sir Creek in Pakistan's territorial domain. Third, the tail of Sir Creek terminates in Badin which is a district in Pakistan.
- (h) Pakistan's claims are very strong and it is very likely that the CLCS will eventually favor Pakistan.

According to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), both countries are time-bound to resolve this dispute because unless this dispute is resolved, neither side will be eligible to exploit their respective Exclusive Economic Zones in the sea.

(III) PRISONERS

The settlement of Sir Creek Dispute can be followed with another important Confidence-Building Measure.

The area of Sir Creek is concentrated with fishermen. Since territorial borders in water (and on land) are not properly marked, fishermen from both sides end up mistakenly trespassing into each other's territorial waters. They are then arrested.

The laws which are used by Pakistan and India to govern their seas and arrest these fishermen have not been conformed by UNCLOS. Pakistani fishermen are arrested by India under the 'Maritime Zones of India Acts, 1976 and 1981'. India is a signatory of the UNCLOS but its maritime zone acts do not conform to the United Nations Convention on Law of the Seas (UNCLOS).

Proposed Solution:

The Pakistan Maritime Security Agency (PMSA) and the Indian Coast Guard (ICG) shall resume the negotiations which were called off after the Mumbai attacks.

These negotiations will ensure:

- a. That whenever Pakistani fishermen are detained in India, the Indian maritime agencies will immediately inform the Pakistani maritime agencies and vice versa.
- b. That the ships and boats of the detained Pakistani fishermen will be handed over to the Pakistani maritime agency by the Indian maritime agencies and vice versa.

Two concrete steps can be taken:

- a. **Joint Judicial Commission on Prisoners, 2007:** Recommendations of this Commission (which was constituted by both governments and comprises of 4 superior retired judges from each side) must be given immediate consideration and implemented. This joint commission (if adequately empowered) can almost resolve the issue of prisoners.
- b. **Agreement of Counselor Access, 2008:** Under this Agreement, prisoners (in both, Pakistan and India) must be provided access to a Counselor immediately after being arrested. The major role of the counselor is to verify the nationality of the prisoner. This process, however, often gets delayed unnecessarily. Often, this delay is from the country to which the prisoner belongs. Interior/Home Ministries, Foreign/External Ministries and the High Commissions of Pakistan and India must therefore promptly strive to avoid any delays in the verification of the nationality of their respective citizens present in each other's jails.

In June 2012, Pakistan released 311 Indian fishermen.

There are 21 deaf, mute and mentally unstable Pakistani prisoners in Indian jails. These prisoners have also completed their sentences. The Indian Supreme Court is looking into the matter of their release but it is encountering a lot of technical hurdles.

Likewise, there are 18 Pakistani Prisoners of War (of 1965 and 1971) still in Indian jails. The next round of talks between the Foreign Ministers of the two countries is expected from September 7 to 9 (2012). There, the return of these 39 prisoners should be a top priority on Pakistan's agenda.

If the Sir Creek issue is resolved, it becomes a moral binding on both parties to simultaneously release ALL those prisoners, who were arrested on the charges of 'Mistaken Trespassing'.

(IV) THE WATER ISSUE

Between the two countries, it is India which is the upper-riparian state. And therefore, in this case it is India which is required to take sensible decisions to protect our peace negotiations from untimely termination.

[The Water 'Issue' must not be treated as a 'Dispute' because calling it a dispute will have its own repercussions. The solution is already in place in the form of 'Indus Water Treaty, 1960' and only a re-interpretation of the treaty is required]

The ISSUE:

- (a)** 1960's Indus Water Treaty gave 3 western rivers to Pakistan.
India was allowed to use some water from these 3 rivers before they enter into Pakistan.
- (b)** India was permitted to use the water for hydropower generation.
The condition was that Indian usage must not alter the natural timing of flow and the quantity of these waters as they enter Pakistan.
- (c)** With Indian hydropower projects, the only concern for Pakistan is the timing of flow because hydropower does not 'consume' water so the quantity remains unaltered.
The timing of the flow is critically important for agriculture in Pakistan.
- (d)** In the 1960 Treaty, India was only allowed limited water storage. This was applied to all the dams which India will build on Jehlum and Chenab.
- (e)** The problem began with the installation of 'physical gates'. India was allowed to install these gates to flush out the silt/waste (coming from glaciers), but India began using it to unfairly 'stop' and unfairly 'release' water into Pakistan.
- (f)** The problem will get more severe when India will complete the construction of Bursar Dam, Kishanganga Dam, Pakuldul Dam, Sawalkot Dam, Dal Huste Dam. In case India decides to go for 'Cumulative Storage' or 'Cumulative Release' of water from these dams, Pakistan will be completely vulnerable to mass destruction (which was allegedly the case with the 2010 floods).

Words of John Briscoe (World Bank's Senior Water Advisor and Neutral Expert on Baglihar Dam case) must be cited for reference :

He says,

"A journalist colleague in Delhi told me that the Indus Treaty is considered an integral part of Kashmir and when it comes to Kashmir, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs instructs newspapers on what they can and cannot say, and often tells them explicitly what it is they are to say".

Proposed Solution-Negotiations and Negotiations:

Pakistan will have to diplomatically assert the right amount of pressure on India for the re-interpretation of the 1960 Indus Water Treaty.

'Right amount of pressure' on India can be exerted by Pakistan in the form of legal hurdles and calls for international arbitration for Indian power projects being built on rivers Jehlum and Chenab.

If the two countries can keep ego aside, there can be numerous ways in which the 1960 Treaty can be implemented to benefit both sides.

A joint monitoring system can also be formulated to ensure timely discharge of water from India to Pakistan. But this is only possible when relations are more cordial and more trust has been developed on both sides.

In fact, India has the potential to 'increase' this flow during difficult planting seasons in Pakistan. This is not an unrealistic suggestion. India does have this potential and can do it without effecting its own power generation. But ofcourse, this can only be made possible when relations between both countries are friendlier.

Joint Power Projects

- (a) India's power outage of 31st July 2012 affected 670 Million Indian citizens, and has considerably reduced the Foreign Direct Investment coming to India.
- (b) This scenario can trigger further collaborations and can get India on board for the Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline Project.
- (c) USA is particularly interested to normalize relations between Pakistan and India so that Pakistan can retreat its forces from its Eastern border and redeploy them on the Western borders along Afghanistan.
- (d) On the other hand, why India is reluctant to rejoin the Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline Project (which was called Iran-Pakistan-India Gas Pipeline Project until India backed off) is because India is a close ally of the USA and the USA did not want India to be a part of this project because of its own concerns with Iran's nuclear program.
- (e) But now, Pakistan can seek an advantage from USA.
- (f) Pakistan shall diplomatically convey this to America that the Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline Project is very essential, not only to address the acute power shortage in both Pakistan and India but also very specifically to enhance developmental-collaboration between the two countries.
- (g) After this, it will be America's call to realize that it must not continue to become an unfair player between Pakistan and India. Assuming that USA decides to stop exerting pressure on India, it will then entirely be India's decision whether or not to pursue the Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline Project.
- (h) After the episode of India's biggest power failure (dated July 31, 2012), chances are that India will now be willing to resume talks on the IP Gas Pipeline Project.
- (i) Also, India aspires to become the regional power-house of South Asia and in the long term, it aspires to out-do China in this quest. If India actually aspires to become the regional power, it should start acting like one and must play its part in enhancing regional collaborations. This, is another reason why India should be more willing to pursue the IP Gas Pipeline Project.

(V) KASHMIR

Kashmir's Stance:

In the words of Mir Waiz Umar Farooq (Chairman All Parties Hurriyat Conference), "Kashmir is not a bilateral issue between Pakistan and India, but a trilateral one which also involves the people of Kashmir".

JKLF (Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front) Chairman Yasin Malik believes that the option of a deep freeze (that is, to freeze the matter in its current position for a few years before relations become stronger between Pakistan and India) is not feasible, without stopping the Indian operation in the Indian-occupied Kashmir.

India can not afford to 'deep-freeze' the matter because of the suspicion that the freedom movement will take over as soon as the Indian operation is stopped.

Tehreek-e-Hurriyat Chairman Syed Ali Shah Gellani strongly advocates Kashmir's 'Right of Self-Determination' and supports Kashmir's alliance with Pakistan. However, he once said:

"Pakistan has morally, diplomatically and politically supported the struggle of the people of Jammu & Kashmir, but this does not mean Pakistan can take a decision on our behalf".

APHC (All Parties Hurriyat Conference) Chairman Mirwaiz Umar Farooq demands:

- a)** 'Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA, 1990)' shall be repealed (UN has called it 'A Violation of International Law' and has asked India to revoke it),
 - b)** Indian troops shall be withdrawn from populated areas of the Valley,
 - c)** Political Detainees shall be released,
- if India wants a peaceful resolution of the dispute.

International Community's Stance:

The International Community wants to resolve the dispute of Kashmir because it sees it as a threat to regional stability in South Asia if two nuclear states, Pakistan and India, are involved in such a tense dispute and are not engaging in economic collaborations with each other.

India's Stance:

India has a two-fold agenda on Kashmir:

- a)** Propagate that unrest in Kashmir is basically 'Pakistan's Proxy War' and Pakistan is logistically supporting the Kashmiri Freedom Fighters,
- b)** Make the Line of Control (LoC) the international border between Pakistan and India.

India is intelligently floating the LoC-Solution in the international community; U.S and U.K are also supporting India's stance as the ultimate solution for Kashmir.

By proposing the LoC-Solution, India is suggesting that both Pakistan and India should enjoy sovereignty over their respective part of Kashmir and that the Kashmiri people can be allowed to travel between both parts more freely.

Proposed Solution-Plebiscite:

(I) If Pakistan wishes to avoid the situation in which the International Community begins exercising diplomatic pressure on Pakistan to accept the Indian formula to settle the Kashmir Dispute, it must come up with more realistic alternatives that take into consideration the popular demands of the people of Kashmir.

(II) Pakistan believes that the main issue is not the 'territorial control' of the land of Kashmir but the 'right of self-determination' of the Kashmiri people. Pakistan should continue to advocate this stance.

(III) Pakistan should use the global forums to remind its international partners that Indian forces deployed in Kashmir, are violating the very basic human rights by engaging in acts of rape and child molestation.

(IV) Pakistan should also use the global forums to remind its international partners that so far, the Indian Government has been unable to get any political set-up accepted by the Kashmiri people.

(V) Pakistan should reiterate its support for the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) as the most prominent representation of the Kashmiri people. Pakistan should also remind the international community that the APHC comprises not only of Islamic fundamentalists but also of liberal and progressive factions like Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) and the Awami Action Committee.

(VI) Pakistan strongly condemns India's accusations that the Kashmir freedom struggle is sponsored by Pakistan. In order to counter these allegations, we invite India's consent on requesting the United Nations to deploy more international observers along the Line of Control.

(VII) Pakistan should counter India's LoC-Solution by terming it a 'military' solution which does not serve the purpose of the freedom movement. Pakistan believes that even after LoC is made the international border between Pakistan and India, the Kashmiri people will not stop their freedom struggle.

(VIII) Series of Bilateral & Trilateral Talks:

Pakistan should be proactive in the current on-going negotiations between Islamabad and Delhi and should diplomatically ensure that these talks do not come to any momentary halts. Pakistan believes that time is of essence and the bilateral dialogue with India should not be allowed to be influenced and stopped by other factors that govern the relation between the two countries.

(a) Pakistan would like to begin the Series with Secretary-Level Talks between the Foreign Secretaries, and then, the Defence Secretaries of the two countries.

(b) The Indian Government shall commit to freeze the military operation in the Indian-occupied Kashmir for the duration of this Series.

(c) The next level of talks will include the Political Leadership (Government + Opposition) of Pakistan, of India and of Kashmir.

(d) To ensure the true representation of the people of Kashmir, an election shall be conducted under international monitoring, to choose the political leadership from all states of Jammu & Kashmir. This political leadership will then represent the territory at the negotiation table.

(e) Pakistan strictly reaffirms that it will simply not entertain any third-party other than the United Nations, for the role of a mediator between Pakistan and India.

[In the unlikely scenario that India proposes to invite the U.S on board as the third-party, Pakistan will rule it out by proposing the name of China.

Pakistan's argument is that the U.S is not a neutral choice because it already favors India's LoC-Solution on the matter and has greater strategic interests with India. China, on the other hand, is the regional power-house and is a greater share-holder in South Asia. Chances are, that India will not agree to the name of China. Eventually, in case of a deadlock, both parties will retreat to the name of United Nations]

(IX) Pakistan's principal stance is to give the Right of Self Determination to Kashmiri people via a Plebiscite.

This stance will be achieved by implementing UN Resolution 47, according to which:

(a) Pakistan will withdraw its nationals (if any) from Kashmir,

(b) India will withdraw the excessive military personals from Kashmir,

(c) UN observers will be deployed to ensure that withdrawal from both sides, is of a reasonable proportion,

(d) Once the withdrawal process is completed, the 'Owen Dixon Model' will be adopted. This model divides Kashmir into 2 zones:

-) Kashmir Valley + Muslim Areas of Jammu + Muslim Areas of Laddakh + Muslim Areas of Kargil,

-) Remaining Districts of Jammu, Laddakh and Leh.

(e) Once the Owen Dixon Model is adopted, Plebiscite can be conducted under United Nation's trusted supervision. The people will vote either in favor of Pakistan or India,

(f) A 3rd option of 'Complete Independence' can be included in the Plebiscite.

[This option is favored by some Kashmiri freedom parties, like Amanullah Khan's JKLF. However, both Pakistan and India are reluctant about the inclusion of this option because that will ignite demands of independence from various areas within India and Pakistan. **In either case, Pakistan still has an advantage and it 'can' afford the inclusion of the 3rd option in the Plebiscite.**

Given Pakistan's affection towards Kashmir, an Independent Kashmir will be economically and politically more inclined towards Pakistan].

In Kashmir's case, Pakistan has a clear edge over India in terms of Time. On one hand, both countries aspire to become members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and must settle all border disputes. On the other hand, in case India does not negotiate on Pakistan's terms and allows the Indian operation in Kashmir to continue, then the Kashmir freedom movement is also likely to continue. This freedom movement and the Indian operation in Kashmir are already costing the Indian forces both, economically and morally. Clearly, India can not afford to let the Kashmir dispute remain unsettled any longer and it must display greater interest in negotiating with Pakistan.

(VI) SIACHEN

Proposed Solution-Zone of Disengagement:

Bringing the two parties to an agreement without one of them compromising their position is not possible in Siachen's case. The Siachen Dispute can not be solved in isolation of other disputes between Pakistan and India.

In light of the recent confidence-building measures in the Trade and Investment sectors, the trade volume between Pakistan and India is expected to reach an incredible US \$ 6 Billion/Year by 2015. When this point is reached, Pakistan will be in a reasonable position to take Kashmir and Siachen simultaneously to the negotiation table with India.

Pakistan will then have to play its cards intelligently.

Pakistan can compromise on a few points on Siachen in exchange for India's commitment to agree to Pakistan's formula of a Plebiscite in Kashmir.

Assuming that the Plebiscite results in Kashmir largely becoming a part of Pakistan, then India will not have much reason to hold on to Siachen as an important strategic glacier to over-look Kashmir.

Next, if Pakistan and India successfully work out their water disputes, India will not have much reason to hold on to Siachen as a major water reservoir and as the source of water for India's northern supply-lines because resolution of the water dispute will also ensure that India's northern water supply is not going to be disrupted by Pakistan.

After this, India's sole interest in Siachen would be in the containment of Chinese forces.

Finally, the Indian Army opposes withdrawal of its troops from Siachen. This is largely because they doubt Pakistan's sincerity in light of the 26/11 Mumbai Terror Attacks and the frequent cross-border terrorist infiltration. If Pakistan commits to aggressively restrict and monitor cross-border terrorist infiltration to India, the Indian Army can also be brought to the negotiation table for resolving the Siachen Dispute.

The following needs to be done:

1. After India agrees for the Kashmir-Plebiscite, Pakistan will agree to mark a few of India's positions on the Actual Ground Position Line at Siachen. This will prompt India to agree to the withdrawal of its troops from the glacier, simultaneously with the withdrawal of Pakistani troops.
2. The United Nations and other International Guarantors will step in to monitor and ensure an adequate withdrawal of forces on both sides.
3. A 'Standard Operating Procedure' will then be formulated.
4. According to this 'Standard Operating Procedure', there will be an 'Absolutely Demilitarized Zone' at Siachen.
5. This demilitarized zone will be a triangular area between Indira Colony in the west, Karakoram Pass in the east and the NJ 9842 point. This will be considered as the Zone of Disengagement.

6. After withdrawal of troops, there can be a redeployment of troops on either side of this zone on the agreed positions only.
7. Neither side will ever try to re-occupy the positions vacated by them, or try to occupy the positions vacated by the other country, or try to occupy new positions along the Zone of Disengagement at Siachen.
8. There will absolutely be no activity (for example, tourist activities) from either side, inside the Zone of Disengagement.
9. All of this will be signed in an iron-clad agreement and the most appropriate technology will be put into place to ensure that neither side is ever able to violate it.

SPECIAL INCLUSION

1. 'International North-South Corridor'-The Implications for Pakistan in the Post-2014 Scenario:

India's \$ 1.06 Trillion total economy is 8 times the size of Pakistan's \$ 207 Billion total economy. In terms of trade, it can be foreseen that for atleast 2 decades, the trade-off will remain in India's favor. This means that Indian trade is not going to be principally reliant upon Pakistan's market. However, India's primary dependence on Pakistan is in terms of the Transit Route. India has been willing to gain access to the Central Asian States of Afghanistan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan via Pakistan. On reaching Iran via Pakistan, India then wants to get connected to Russia, eventually connecting its markets to Europe.

Over several years, Pakistan has shown reluctance in providing this transit to India. This sole major dependence of Indian trade on Pakistan is now significantly reduced by the blueprints of 'International North-South Corridor' which were finalized in March 2012. 'International North-South Corridor' is a transit network that will connect India's west coast to Iranian ports, all the way beyond Russia. The network will reduce the transportation time from the current 2 months (via Suez Canal) to 1 month. 14 South and Central Asian nations have stakes in the Project.

Pakistan must not continue to remain in the haze that India will never find a transit alternative and will always remain dependent upon Pakistan for a direct land/water transit route to Central Asia. Now is the time when Pakistan must tactfully utilize the "**Afghan-Pak Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA)**". In the Agreement, instead of putting the condition that Pakistan will only allow the transit of Indian goods to Afghanistan after all bilateral issues between Pakistan and India have been solved, Pakistan must revisit its stance.

By allowing a selective category of Indian goods to be transported under this Agreement, Pakistan will make 2 gains:

- a. The obvious direct benefit will come in the form of Transit Fees,
- b. The second gain is more important in view of US and NATO Departure from Afghanistan in 2014. Pakistan is seeking important diplomatic offices in Afghanistan (these offices will become significantly important for regional stability and security after 2014). If Pakistan permits the transit of Indian goods to Afghanistan under APTTA, this step of Pakistan will be seen by the international community (particularly the US) as an affirmation of Pakistan's new position that it is no more seeing Afghanistan as a 'Strategic Patch' against India. This affirmation is important to pursue the US to give important diplomatic offices in Afghanistan to Pakistan.

[Getting these offices is mandatory for Pakistan's own internal security because diplomatic presence in Afghanistan will mean practical and mature diplomatic ties with the Afghans]

Meanwhile, Pakistan's internal security policies will have to be revisited. Heavy deployments will have to be made along the Durand Line in the post-2014 scenario. This deployment will be

needed to curb cross-border terrorist infiltration from Afghanistan which is expected to rise in the absence of NATO forces and in the presence of Indian diplomats in Afghanistan.

[In the long-run, these deployments will help Pakistan in its motive of getting the 'international border' status for Durand Line. Also, decreased border tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan and decreased cross-border militant activities after these deployments will make Pakistan more eligible to become member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization which requires the aspirant countries to settle their border tensions]

THE 4 PRINCIPLES

(Principle Number 01)

Indian officials must fully commit that they will completely refrain from giving public statements over the internal security issues of Pakistan. This, is in reference to the issues in Balochistan and in reference to religious minorities in Sindh.

Pakistan is itself capable of understanding and addressing the grievances of its people and is not dependent on news and statements to come from India to tell Pakistan what is happening inside it.

The episode of '**Jacobabad Hindu Migration**' should simply not be used as an exploitation ground by India and the Indian High Commission must answer why it issued 250 visas to Hindu citizens of Pakistan without strict verification.

(Principle Number 02)

Whenever India will question Pakistan about the arrest and trial of **Maulana Masood Azhar** (Hijacker of Indian Airlines Flight IC-814 in 1999) and **Hafiz Muhammad Saeed** (Chief Lashkar-e-Toiba, Mumbai Attacks 26/11/2008) and about the release of **Sarabjit Singh**, Pakistan will make it conditional to 3 things,

- i) Investigation about S.B.S Tomar who was allegedly an Indian diplomat and a RAW under-cover agent who was present on the IC-814 flight and was secretly giving instructions to the rest of the hijackers.
- ii) Investigation about the alleged involvement of RAW and the Indian Intelligence Bureau in providing logistic support to the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) in Balochistan since 1970s.
- iii) Investigation about RAW's involvement in the 2009 Srilankan Team Attack.

(Principle Number 03)

The BCCI (Board of Control for Cricket in India) and the Indian Ministry of Sports must not engage in attempts to sabotage Pakistan's image in the world of cricket and sports.

As a part of cricket diplomacy, official statements should be issued by India to encourage other countries to come and play in Pakistan. It would be highly appreciated if the Indian Cricket Team would be the first to visit Pakistan for a series.

(Principle Number 04)

Pakistan will intimate this to India that if Pakistan introduces stricter reforms to censor or ban Indian channels or movies or media content of any form (from television, internet, radio and all other outlets of media), India shall not object to it and shall not let it hinder the negotiation process. The unchecked inflow of Indian cinema and television shows has cost Pakistan immense moral degradation.